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Always online, never off duty? Constitutionalising the Right to Disconnect in India

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Abstract
The rapid digitalisation of contemporary workplaces has fundamentally altered the temporal structure of labour, often eroding the boundary between professional obligations and personal life. The growing expectation of constant digital availability has generated concerns regarding employee autonomy, privacy, and psychological well-being, particularly in sectors characterised by remote work and globalised communication networks. Within the Indian legal framework, however, labour regulation remains largely silent on the problem of after-hours digital engagement, creating a normative gap in the protection of workers' temporal autonomy.
This article examines whether the emerging concept of the "Right to Disconnect" can be constitutionally grounded within the existing framework of the Indian Constitution. Rather than proposing an entirely new fundamental right, the study argues that the normative foundations for such protection already exist within the interpretive evolution of Articles 14, 19, and 21. Drawing upon the jurisprudence of dignity, privacy, and proportionality particularly following the landmark privacy judgment in *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India* the article conceptualises digital disconnection as an aspect of temporal autonomy and informational self-determination.
The analysis situates the Right to Disconnect at the intersection of constitutional liberty and labour regulation, demonstrating how unchecked digital intrusion may undermine dignity, equality, and humane working conditions. By examining regulatory gaps in Indian labour legislation and engaging with comparative developments in European jurisdictions, the article proposes a calibrated constitutional approach that balances legitimate employer interests with the protection of individual autonomy. It concludes that constitutional principles can provide a doctrinal foundation for recognising limits on compelled digital availability while leaving detailed implementation to legislative and institutional frameworks.

Keywords: Right to Disconnect, Constitutional Dignity, Digital Labour Regulation, Temporal Autonomy, Right to Life.

Introduction

The digital transformation of the Indian workplace has fundamentally altered the structure, temporality, and expectations of labour. Over the last decade—accelerated significantly by the COVID-19 pandemic—remote work, hybrid models, platform-mediated employment, and digitally integrated corporate ecosystems have become entrenched features of India's work environment. Information technology firms, start-ups, consulting services, media organizations, educational institutions, and even segments of the public sector increasingly rely upon continuous digital communication through email, enterprise software, video conferencing platforms, and instant messaging applications. While such technological integration has enhanced productivity and flexibility, it has simultaneously dissolved the conventional boundaries that once demarcated professional obligations from personal time.

In the pre-digital industrial model, labour was spatially and temporally contained within the factory floor or office premises, and although exploitation persisted, working hours were at least formally demarcated. By contrast, contemporary digital connectivity has generated a condition of "perpetual availability," in which employees are implicitly expected to remain responsive beyond designated hours. (Melissa Mazmanian, Wanda J. Orlikowski, JoAnne Yates, 2013) [22] This pattern is particularly visible in India's information technology and globally integrated service sectors, where time-zone differentials and performance metrics normalise continuous engagement. Such erosion of temporal boundaries is not merely a managerial concern; it implicates constitutional values. When professional obligation extends indefinitely into private time, the issue transcends workplace flexibility and raises questions about dignity, liberty, and equality within a constitutional democracy. (De Stefano, 2018) [16]

This transformation raises a fundamental constitutional question: does the expectation of constant digital availability infringe upon an individual's autonomy, dignity, and privacy? While Indian labour statutes regulate wages, safety, and social security, they remain largely silent on digital disengagement. The Right to Disconnect has neither been codified in Indian labour legislation nor explicitly articulated in constitutional jurisprudence. This article argues that such recognition does not require doctrinal innovation ex nihilo; rather, it emerges from a principled extension of established constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 19, and 21. By situating digital rest within the jurisprudence of dignity, proportionality, and humane working conditions, the article contends that a calibrated constitutional model can address the structural pressures of perpetual connectivity without unsettling legitimate business interests.

This article proceeds in five parts. It first traces the historical development of the Right to Disconnect in comparative jurisdictions. It then examines the Indian statutory framework to identify existing regulatory gaps, particularly within the consolidated labour codes. The article next analyses the constitutional foundations of temporal autonomy under Articles 14, 19, and 21, supported

by relevant judicial precedents. It thereafter considers structural constraints within India's labour market that may affect implementation. Finally, it proposes a calibrated constitutional model grounded in proportionality, non-retaliation safeguards, and institutional accountability.

Historical Development of Right to Disconnect

History reveals that the Right to Disconnect has emerged primarily within jurisdictions where labour protections are deeply institutionalised and collective bargaining mechanisms are robust. The most commonly cited legislative recognition of the Right to Disconnect originates in France. (France Labour Code Reform, 2016) [1] Amendments to the French Labour Code in 2016 [1] required enterprises above a specified threshold to negotiate with employees on mechanisms regulating after-hours digital communication. Importantly, the French model does not impose an absolute prohibition on post-work contact; instead, it mandates corporate-level negotiation and codification of digital boundaries. The regulatory philosophy thus emphasises structured dialogue and institutional accountability rather than rigid prohibition. The French experience demonstrates that the Right to Disconnect is conceived not merely as a privacy claim but as a labour-governance reform embedded in collective bargaining frameworks.

Correspondingly, developments within the European Union further reinforced the recognition of rest as integral to labour dignity. The Working Time Directive, while not expressly articulating a "Right to Disconnect," guaranteed minimum daily and weekly rest periods, maximum working hours, and paid leave. More recently, the European Parliament has encouraged member states to formally recognise digital disengagement rights in light of remote work expansion. The European approach therefore conceptualised digital rest as an extension of pre-existing labour time regulation rather than as an entirely novel constitutional entitlement.

Right to Disconnect and Existing Regulations in India

Though constitutional provisions offers a normative foundation for recognising individual privacy and digital safety as part of fundamental rights, the statutory landscape in India reveals a conspicuous regulatory silence on digital disengagement. Contemporary labour reforms—particularly the consolidation of central labour laws into four labour codes—have modernised several aspects of employment governance, yet they remain largely inattentive to the temporal and psychological implications of digital over-connectivity.

The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 [4] aims to secure safe and humane working environments. Its orientation, however, remains primarily physical and infrastructural, focusing on workplace safety standards, working hours, leave entitlements, and welfare provisions. Although the Code regulates maximum working hours and overtime, it does not address the phenomenon of digital spillover-where work-related communication extends beyond formally prescribed working hours through electronic devices. In practice, the formal limitation of working hours becomes normatively diluted when employees remain digitally accessible after official duty hours without express overtime classification.

Similarly, the Code on Wages, 2019 [6] and the Code on Social Security, 2020 [5] attempt to rationalise wage structures and extend social protection to gig and platform workers. While the latter represents a significant step in recognising non-traditional employment relationships, it stops short of regulating algorithmic management practices or constant digital availability expectations embedded within platform-based work. The absence of statutory safeguards against perpetual connectivity renders such workers structurally vulnerable.

Thus the existing legislation does not adequately confront the rise of employer surveillance technologies. Monitoring software, productivity trackers, and mandatory after-hours communication through messaging applications operate in a grey regulatory zone. Although data protection principles articulated by Supreme Court in several judgements impose constitutional constraints on informational intrusions, statutory labour law has yet to integrate these constitutional standards into workplace governance frameworks.

It is noteworthy that policy discourse within India has intermittently acknowledged this lacuna. Private Member's legislative proposals seeking recognition of a Right to Disconnect indicate emerging awareness of the issue. However, in the absence of binding statutory reform, such initiatives remain aspirational rather than operational. Moreover, given that labour falls within the Concurrent List under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, coordinated central and state-level intervention would be necessary to ensure uniformity and enforceability.

The regulatory gap is particularly acute in the expanding information technology sector, where employment contracts frequently incorporate flexibility clauses that effectively normalise extended availability. Contractual freedom, however, cannot be construed as absolute where structural inequality shapes bargaining power. The absence of explicit statutory parameters allows digital overreach to masquerade as consensual flexibility.

In sum, the present statutory architecture addresses the material and economic dimensions of labour but does not yet internalise the temporal autonomy concerns generated by digitalisation. This normative vacuum reinforces the importance of constitutional adjudication and calibrated legislative reform. Without statutory recognition, the Right to Disconnect remains dependent on judicial interpretation and corporate self-regulation, neither of which provides uniform or predictable protection across India's heterogeneous labour market.

Accordingly, in the absence of explicit legislative articulation, the inquiry must turn to the Constitution as the primary doctrinal foundation for recognising and structuring a Right to Disconnect. It becomes necessary to examine the relevant constitutional provisions and the interpretive jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which have historically supplied normative guidance where statutory frameworks remain underdeveloped.

Constitutional Provisions and Right to Disconnect

The constitutional viability of a Right to Disconnect in India must be examined not as an isolated labour entitlement but as an emergent dimension of the broader rights framework governing dignity, liberty, equality, and humane working conditions. The Indian Constitution does not explicitly articulate temporal autonomy in employment; yet, its interpretive evolution—particularly through Articles 21, 19,

and 14 against the backdrop of Articles 38, 39, and 42—provides a robust normative matrix within which such a right may be located.

Article 21, as judicially transformed, is no longer confined to mere protection against physical deprivation of life or liberty. The Supreme Court in its judgements constitutionalised substantive due process, insisting that any procedure interfering with personal liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. This interpretive shift opened the doctrinal space for integrating qualitative dimensions of life—including dignity and autonomy—within constitutional protection.

Subsequent jurisprudence has consistently expanded Article 21 to include the right to life with dignity, the right to livelihood, and the right to humane working conditions. The recognition of privacy as a fundamental right in subsequent judgements of Supreme Court further strengthened the constitutional scaffolding for digital disengagement. Privacy, as articulated by the Supreme Court, encompasses informational control, decisional autonomy, and protection against unwarranted intrusion. Although the judgments arose in the context of state action, its normative articulation of dignity and autonomy possesses horizontal implications, particularly in regulated employment environments. Thus, Article 21, read in its contemporary doctrinal fullness, contains within it the normative seeds of a limited and proportionate Right to Disconnect grounded in dignity, mental well-being, and informational self-determination.

Likewise article 19(1)(g) guarantees to all citizens the freedom to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business, subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6). While typically invoked by employers or business entities, the provision also protects the professional autonomy of workers. The freedom to practise a profession presupposes that participation in economic life does not entail the forfeiture of constitutional personhood. When employment contracts impose open-ended expectations of connectivity without temporal limitation, they risk transforming professional engagement into a state of perpetual obligation. Although contractual freedom remains a central principle of labour relations, constitutional scrutiny becomes relevant where contractual terms generate conditions inconsistent with reasonableness.

Furthermore, professional freedom includes the capacity to determine the manner and timing of one's labour within agreed parameters. A constitutional reading of Article 19(1)(g) in harmony with Article 21 suggests that economic participation cannot justify the wholesale subordination of personal autonomy.

Along with these two, article 14's guarantee against arbitrariness offers an additional constitutional foothold. The Supreme Court's arbitrariness doctrine has evolved to invalidate state action that is capricious, disproportionate, or lacking in rational principle. Although private employers are not ordinarily "State" under Article 12, employment practices may fall within constitutional scrutiny in cases involving public sector entities, statutory bodies, or where regulatory frameworks impose obligations upon private actors.

Further, the Directive Principles of State Policy reinforce the constitutional orientation toward humane labour standards. (Basu, 2023) [13] Article 38 envisions a social order informed by justice; Article 39 directs the State to secure adequate means of livelihood; and Article 42 explicitly mandates just and humane conditions of work. Although non-justiciable, these provisions guide constitutional interpretation and legislative policy.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly adopted a harmonious construction of Parts III and IV, treating Directive Principles as interpretive aids in expanding the content of fundamental rights.(Sathe, 2002) [24] Humane working conditions in the twenty-first century necessarily include protection against digital excess. If industrial-era labour law recognised limits on physical working hours, the digital era demands analogous safeguards for cognitive and temporal integrity.

Therefore, the constitutional architecture—when read holistically—does not treat labour merely as an economic transaction but as an activity embedded in dignity, equality, and social justice. The Right to Disconnect, understood as a calibrated protection against unreasonable digital intrusion, emerges as a plausible doctrinal extension rather than a radical innovation.

In sum, Articles 21, 19, and 14, illuminated by the Directive Principles and shaped by privacy jurisprudence, collectively furnish a constitutional foundation upon which the Right to Disconnect may be articulated. The challenge lies not in doctrinal absence but in judicial willingness to adapt established principles to the realities of digitally mediated labour.

Judicial Foundations and Right to Disconnect

Although Indian courts have not yet expressly recognised a "Right to Disconnect," the doctrinal architecture necessary for its articulation is already embedded within constitutional jurisprudence. The evolution of privacy, dignity, proportionality, and humane working conditions—particularly under Article 21—provides a coherent normative trajectory for recognising protection against compelled digital availability.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India(2017) [8]

The most significant doctrinal anchor, in relation to privacy, informational self-determination, and temporal autonomy, emerges from the nine-judge bench decision in this case wherein privacy was affirmed as an intrinsic component of life and personal liberty under Article 21. The judgment conceptualised privacy not merely as spatial seclusion but as decisional autonomy and informational control. It emphasised individual sovereignty over personal choices, dignity, and the development of personality.(Panigrahi, P., & Mehta, E., 2022) [23]

While the case arose in the context of state surveillance and biometric data, its reasoning is structurally transferable to digital labour conditions. Informational self-determination necessarily includes the authority to regulate access to one's time, attention, and communicative space.(Talapina, 2022) [26] Persistent employer intrusion through after-hours digital communications may not resemble classic surveillance, yet it implicates the same constitutional concerns: erosion of autonomy, asymmetry of power, and the chilling of decisional freedom.

Further, the proportionality standard articulated in this case requiring legality, legitimate aim, necessity, and balancing—offers an analytical tool for evaluating employer-imposed expectations of continuous connectivity.(Bhatia, 2019) [15] Even where business efficiency constitutes a legitimate aim, blanket demands for

perpetual responsiveness may fail the necessity and balancing prongs, particularly when less restrictive alternatives (rotational duty systems, emergency-only protocols, contractual clarity) are available. Thus, privacy jurisprudence, when read purposively, extends beyond data protection into the terrain of temporal autonomy—a foundational premise for recognising a limited Right to Disconnect.

Similarly judicial scrutiny of employment conditions—particularly within public employment—has repeatedly invoked the arbitrariness doctrine under Article 14. (Khaitan, Equality: legislative review under Article 14, 2016) [21] Service rules and disciplinary standards must satisfy constitutional reasonableness. Although private employment relationships present distinct doctrinal challenges, constitutional principles increasingly permeate contractual arrangements, especially where structural inequality limits meaningful consent.

The proportionality doctrine, reaffirmed in this case, offers a refined evaluative framework. Expectations of continuous availability must be assessed against the gravity of intrusion into personal liberty. A differentiated approach is essential: emergency services and critical infrastructure sectors may justify heightened availability, whereas blanket norms in ordinary corporate settings may not withstand constitutional balancing.

Sukdeb Saha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2025) [12]

Supreme Court recognised mental well-being as an integral component of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, a principle reaffirmed in *Sukdeb Saha* judgement. In the context of contemporary digital environments, the phenomenon of perpetual connectivity imposes a cumulative psychological burden manifested in stress, burnout, and anxiety. Such conditions directly implicate constitutional protections, as digital well-being is closely intertwined with mental well-being and human dignity. When institutional practices structurally normalise continuous digital availability and thereby generate systemic psychological harms, constitutional adjudication cannot remain indifferent.

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) [14]

In this judgement the Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantee of life under Article 21 encompasses the right to live with human dignity, which necessarily includes just and humane conditions of labour (Bhargava, 2023). Although the case arose in the context of bonded labour, the Court's reasoning transcended the immediate factual matrix and grounded labour dignity within the broader framework of constitutional morality rather than mere statutory protection.

The principle that exploitative labour conditions violate constitutional guarantees is adaptable to contemporary forms of digital compulsion. Modern coercion is less visible than physical bondage but may manifest through algorithmic management, implicit performance metrics, and fear of professional marginalisation. Compelled digital responsiveness, particularly outside contractual hours, can amount to an extension of labour without formal recognition, compensation, or rest.

Moreover, dignity jurisprudence has consistently recognised that constitutional protection evolves alongside socio-economic transformations (Khaitan, 2014) [20]. As labour becomes increasingly dematerialised and mediated through digital platforms, the meaning of "humane conditions" must correspondingly adapt. The constitutional commitment to dignity cannot remain confined to industrial-era exploitation; it must address the subtler encroachments of the information age.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan(1997)

Indian apex courts have, on multiple occasions, articulated normative standards in the absence of comprehensive legislative frameworks. A paradigmatic illustration is this case, where the Supreme Court formulated binding guidelines to address sexual harassment at the workplace. The Court grounded its intervention in Articles 14, 19, and 21, read alongside international conventions, thereby filling a legislative vacuum.

The jurisprudential method adopted in this judgement is instructive. The Court did not claim legislative supremacy; rather, it operationalised constitutional guarantees until statutory enactment could occur. The recognition of a Right to Disconnect may follow a similar trajectory. Where digital overreach demonstrably undermines dignity, privacy, or equality, courts may craft calibrated standards—such as requiring clear contractual delineation of work hours, mandating emergency-only communication policies, or protecting employees from adverse consequences for non-response during designated rest periods.

This precedent demonstrates that judicial articulation of emergent workplace rights is neither unprecedented nor institutionally illegitimate. It is consistent with India's transformative constitutional ethos.

Structural Constraints to Right to Disconnect in India

The recognition of a Right to Disconnect in India encounters structural impediments embedded within the architecture of its labour market, constitutional design, and institutional enforcement capacity. The most formidable constraint arises from the predominance of informality. A substantial proportion of India's workforce is employed in the informal economy, where labour relations are frequently characterized by the absence of written contracts, clearly defined working hours, and enforceable employment protections (International Labour Organization, 2018) [19]. For such workers, the boundary between labour and rest is shaped less by legal regulation and more by economic necessity. The normative claim to digital disengagement thus risks privileging organised-sector employees while leaving informal and home-based workers unaffected. Any attempt at doctrinal or legislative articulation must therefore confront the dualism of India's labour economy.

The rapid expansion of platform-mediated work compounds this challenge. Gig workers functioning through algorithmic management systems experience a form of indirect compulsion: ratings, surge incentives, and performance metrics reward continuous online presence without formally mandating it. The legal classification of such workers as independent contractors complicates the extension of labour protections and raises jurisprudential questions concerning the horizontal application of fundamental rights(Sundar, 2020) [25]. Moreover, union density remains limited in precisely those sectors—information technology, start-ups, and digital services—where hyper-connectivity is most pronounced. In the absence of robust collective bargaining

structures, individual employees possess little negotiating power to resist expectations of perpetual availability.

Cultural and institutional norms further entrench the problem. Professional responsiveness is frequently equated with commitment and productivity, particularly in globally integrated industries operating across time zones. Regulatory intervention in such environments may be perceived as economically disruptive. Enforcement difficulties also persist, as digital overreach often manifests through implicit expectations rather than explicit directives, rendering coercion evidentially complex. Finally, the federal distribution of legislative competence over labour, situated in the Concurrent List of the Constitution, necessitates coordinated Union–State action to prevent regulatory fragmentation. These structural realities do not negate the normative desirability of digital rest, but they underscore the need for a context-sensitive and institutionally calibrated framework.

Comparative and Constitutional Lessons for Normative Adaptation

Comparative developments, particularly within European jurisdictions, offer instructive insights, though not templates for mechanical transplantation. In France, legislative recognition of digital disengagement through reforms to the Labour Code has required enterprises to negotiate after-hours communication protocols with employee representatives. At the supranational level, the European Parliament has advocated recognition of the Right to Disconnect as an element of occupational health and safety.(European Parliament, 2021) [3] These models demonstrate that digital overwork is conceptualised not merely as a contractual matter but as a structural workplace risk requiring institutional response.

For India, the primary lesson lies in the framing of the right. Rather than constructing it as an absolute prohibition on after-hours contact, comparative practice situates it within a proportional and negotiated regulatory structure. Exceptions for managerial roles, emergency services, and operational exigencies are incorporated through calibrated safeguards. Such an approach resonates with India's constitutional proportionality doctrine articulated by Supreme Court in various cases where any intrusion into autonomy must satisfy legitimacy, necessity, and balancing. The comparative experience thus reinforces the viability of structured limits rather than categorical insulation.

Another lesson concerns institutional embedding. In many European contexts, digital disengagement is integrated into occupational safety regimes that recognise psychosocial hazards. Indian labour enforcement has historically prioritised physical safety, while mental health and digital fatigue remain under-theorised in regulatory practice. Adapting comparative insights would therefore require expanding the interpretive ambit of workplace safety to encompass algorithmic pressure and cognitive overload. Additionally, collective bargaining has functioned as a central enforcement mechanism abroad; India's relatively limited coverage in knowledge sectors suggests that statutory baseline protections may be necessary to compensate for institutional gaps. Comparative experience ultimately illustrates that the Right to Disconnect is compatible with economic competitiveness when embedded within coherent regulatory and constitutional principles.

Pathways for Operationalising a Context-Sensitive Right to Disconnect

Transforming normative recognition into effective protection requires a multi-layered strategy integrating constitutional adjudication, legislative structuring, and corporate governance reform. Judicial development under Article 21 of the Constitution offers an immediate doctrinal pathway. The expansive interpretation of personal liberty and the subsequent affirmation of dignity and privacy in various court judgements establish temporal and decisional autonomy as constitutionally protected interests. Courts, particularly in public employment contexts, may articulate minimum standards prohibiting systematic and punitive expectations of perpetual digital availability. Drawing inspiration from the creative judicial guidelines formulated in some of the cases courts could frame interim principles pending legislative clarification, especially where fundamental rights are implicated.

Legislative intervention, however, would enhance certainty and uniformity. The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 [4] could be interpreted or amended to include digital overwork within the concept of humane conditions of labour. Statutory provisions might require enterprises above a specified threshold to adopt transparent communication policies defining working hours, delineating emergency exceptions, and prohibiting retaliation for reasonable non-responsiveness. Special consideration must be afforded to gig and platform workers, whose algorithmic management structures necessitate safeguards against economic coercion masked as flexibility. Harmonised Union–State coordination is essential to avoid fragmented compliance regimes.

Beyond adjudication and legislation, corporate governance mechanisms provide a complementary route. Integrating digital well-being into Environmental, Social, and Governance metrics and board-level compliance frameworks can incentivise internal policy reform. Multinational enterprises operating in India may align global best practices with constitutional values, thereby reducing adversarial litigation while enhancing reputational legitimacy. Ultimately, operationalising a Right to Disconnect in India requires neither rigid transplantation nor symbolic proclamation. It demands calibrated institutional design that reconciles economic dynamism with constitutional commitments to dignity, equality, and humane working conditions in the digital age.

Conclusion: Towards a Calibrated Constitutional Model of Digital Rest

The constitutional recognition of a Right to Disconnect in India must proceed through calibration rather than absolutism. The digital transformation of labour has not rendered after-hours communication inherently illegitimate; rather, it has exposed the structural risks of normalised and expectation-driven perpetual availability. A constitutionally sustainable response must therefore distinguish between legitimate operational exigencies and systemic intrusion into protected personal time. The objective is not insulation from all post-work engagement, but the prevention of coercive connectivity that undermines dignity and autonomy.

A calibrated constitutional model may rest upon three interrelated principles. First, temporal autonomy must be acknowledged as an aspect of personal liberty. The interpretive expansion of Article 21 established that liberty

is substantive rather than merely procedural. When it is read alongside the affirmation of decisional and informational autonomy the Constitution protects an individual's authority over non-working hours as a dimension of dignity. Digital rest thus emerges not as a statutory concession but as a derivative constitutional guarantee.

Second, proportional employer justification must anchor any intrusion into this sphere. The proportionality doctrine requires that after-hours engagement pursue a legitimate aim, be necessary to achieve that aim, and maintain balance between institutional objectives and individual rights. Routine or blanket expectations of responsiveness would struggle to satisfy this standard, whereas narrowly tailored emergency communication may pass constitutional scrutiny.

Third, non-retaliation safeguards are indispensable. Even where communication occurs, adverse employment consequences for reasonable non-responsiveness would render the right illusory. Constitutional equality under Article 14 reinforces the prohibition of arbitrary or punitive enforcement practices.

Such a model harmonises transformative constitutionalism with economic pragmatism. It neither constitutionalises idleness nor disregards business necessity. Instead, it affirms that technological advancement must operate within normative limits defined by dignity, fairness, and structured justification. In this calibrated form, Right to Disconnect becomes an evolutionary extension of established jurisprudence, capable of mediating power in the digitally networked workplace while preserving institutional flexibility.

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