

Transitional society and participation of women in the public sphere: A survey of Qatar society

Dr. Kaltham Al-Ghanim

Center for Humanities and Social Sciences, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to assess the Qatar population current perceptions about women rights: like spouse selection, education, and their attitudes toward women's new roles in Qatari society in transition period. Data was collected from responses of 1010 Qatari citizen participant in to a survey study. The survey results suggest that Qataris are responsive to traditional patriarchal gender roles of kinship family structures regarding roles that are suitable for women outside the household. The results found that the effects of modernization apparently do not pervade many traditional attitudes about gender differences, which influence women public participation.

Keywords: culture, gender roles, modernization, attitudes, women, family, public participation

1. Introduction

Since 1950, many changes have occurred in Gulf States as results of economic and social change. These change led to raise women education, participation in the work force and community activities, decline in the fertility rates and change the family size and roles (UNFPA, 2012, Zakria, 2013; Hamadeh, et al., 2008 and Gargani G, *et al*, 2012) ^[50, 3]. However, All Arab Gulf States still rank relatively low with respect to gender equality (Human Development Report, 2013 & The Global Gender Gap Report, 2013) ^[63, 90]. As yet more than half century of the beginning of the education system and women become more educated and well qualified, their involvement in the society remains limited and does not meet the developmental needs of the countries involved (Wanda Krause, 2009) ^[58]. In addition, their participation in the labor market in Qatar and other Gulf State still face many problems, where most of women work in certain sector and professions, such as education and health sector as educators and administrative staff (Qatar workforce report 2013, Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, 2012) ^[86]. This reality became crucial; since these countries are facing a lack in the number of the population, while their development vision very ambitious.

The perceptions of work divisions based on sex lead to gendered women actions outside household, patterned women participation in labor market and to hold the leadership positions. These attitudes are determine women situations especially in the transition era when the modernity requirements vis. with the traditional norms.

This study start from point of view that people when doing social in the daily life they are used the housework sex roles symbols (Schneider, 2012) ^[80]. This study start from point of view that assumes that the boundaries between women's and men's social statuses and people opinion about women roles in public life still effected by the traditional culture of women social roles somehow effect women participations in labor sector and in public sphere in these societies. Even in the globalization context, the traditional social roles continue to influence women's lives and determine gender stratification in the region (Stenslie, 2012). People use their understanding

of gender roles as standards to judge women's behaviors and role compliance in public situations and positions, such as businesses, professions, and in leadership roles in civil society (Shallal, 2011) ^[82]. These sociocultural norms lead to gendered behavior toward women inside and outside the household, pattern women's participation in the labor market, reduce their opportunities to enter leadership positions, and limit their chances to obtain power in their societies.

This study tried to show that although economic changes, increased educational attainment, and other factors, which are, derived from the modernization those have generated a variety of cultural changes. People still use their traditional attitude and norms to understanding of gender roles as standards to judge women's behaviors and role compliance in public situations and positions, such as businesses, professions, and in leadership roles in civil society (Shallal, 2011) ^[82] and families continue to distribute power and roles based on gender roles.

Data derived from responses to questions asked in a survey of Qatari citizens. The study analyzed people attitude towards women rights and roles to find out women professional roles.

The importance of the study lies to found out the inability whether the social change in the region as Qatar society is part of them, and able to change the stereotypical attitudes that determine control women movement in the public sphere.

Women situation in the region

In the overall Arab region, and, particularly, in the Arab Gulf States, social structures are deeply influenced by kinship relations (Al-Naqib, 1990, 1996) ^[17, 18]. The kinship systems have significant effects on individuals and societies. Historically, the region has a long tradition of tribal structures in which kinship is the fundamental factor that binds people together in their groups (Al-Naqib, 1990; Fromherz, 2012) ^[47] ^[17]. Tribal organization has existed for at least 3,000 years and people still relate to their lineages following their grandfather's genealogical line through time. Each tribe has its own lineage tree.

In kinship systems, people identify themselves by their patrilineal lineage in social structural descent (Salzman, 2008)

[79] in which the grandfather occupies the central position of the kin group and the members identify themselves according to his line (Al-Hidari, 2003) [9]. Therefore, people classify themselves according to their roles in the kin structure. Men, based on the grandfather head, are the sources of social identities and social definitions relative to other tribes and men are vested with the power to control the actions and attitudes of the family and, particularly, the women in their kin group (Salzman, 2008) [79]. The kin-group relationships assigns specific roles according to the positions in the kinship group were males as they are principle of family and women principle of productivity and caring of children (Al-Hidari 2003) [9]. This division of sex roles generated culture view woman as a carrier for man seeds so any women can carry those seeds, where man role viewed as the source of those seed and he is principal of carryon and protect the kinships linages. In such structure, men have higher statuses in the kinship system.

A woman is important to the status of her kinship group only by her ability to improve her tribe's status through marriage. In the tribal group, the social roles are clearly identified according to gender and the statuses of men and women in the kinship structure. Over time, the division of roles by gender generated the patriarchal system that continues to shape the boundaries of women's positions inside and outside the family unit of Arab societies (Al-Hidari, 2003; Sharabi, 1993) [9, 83]. Furthermore, in the kinship structure, the distribution of family responsibilities inevitably becomes hierarchical because males are the household heads and women are subordinate property (Barakat, 1998, 1999). Because the system is based on kinship, all social roles are gendered, and based on the social positions within the kinship group. Women are necessarily lower class and the statuses are unequal, which results in gender inequality. The kinship basis of social structure is the most important factor for gender relations in the Arab region.

In kin-based systems, men have the authority to direct women's activities inside the familial domain and in the public sphere (McLean and Anderson, 2009) [64].

The type of this system distributed the roles and rights based on gender, in this case men have the right to control women (Al-Hidari, 2003; El-Haddad, 2003) [9, 39]. So the grandfather, father, brothers and other males in the extended family such brothers of father and mothers have the right to determine women's choices. Al-Hidari 2003 argued that the masculine cultural expectations reproduced by Arab family structure is the main factor behind the gender relations and differences. This culture give men the rights to control women.

The socio-economic changes and other modernization factors generated different kinds of changes in the martial life in the Arab Gulf states (Alharahsheh, 2013). These changes have not changed much of societal attitudes towards women roles and right. These differences garneted conflicts in the family such, marital conflicts, domestics violence and raise the rate of divorces (Al-Ghanim 2009, Anser, 2014) [6, 24]. The conflicts resulted based on the discrepancy between the tradition social roles expectations and the new roles which the social changes required.

However, although the extended family type is less dominant in Arab countries, a shift to the nuclear family type has not necessarily occurred. Family values still seem to reflect kinship ties and extended family relationships (El-Haddad,

2003) [39], apparently leaving the traditional gender roles intact and operative in people's lives (Mohammed, 2008) [67]. Several field studies have found that the traditional family relationships continue to influence women's daily lives. For example, in a case study of five families, the husbands and wives were interviewed. The wives agreed that power was in the hands of their husbands (or other male relatives) (Al-Merekhi, 2010) [13]. Another recent study of families in Qatar showed that the distribution of family responsibilities continues in the traditional pattern where women's main duties are the servicing and care of the children and the housework in which the men do not participate (Al- Kubaisi, 2010). However, (Al-Merekhi 2010) [13] found that women with relatively higher educational attainment participate more in decision-making, although another study found that women's participation does not reflect equal partnership in family decision-making (Al-Othman, 2006) [21]. These studies results suggest that family roles in Arab societies are still influenced by extended family ties and the patriarchal values that give men authority over the women in their families.

Gulf Women's situation

Women's labor force participation has steadily increased in the Gulf States. For example, as a percentage of the national labor force, women make up 53% in Kuwait, 47% in Bahrain, 34% in Qatar, 37% in Oman, and 16% in Saudi Arabia (Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, 2012: P.46) [86]. Women's labor force participation is related to the influence of the oil era when oil revenues were used to help these countries pursue socio-economic development, although modernization resulting from oil discovery began and preceded differently depending on the country. Most of the working women in these countries are in the educational sector; for example, 79% of the total female workforce in Qatar works in education sector (Qatar Statistics Authority, 2011-2013) [72] and 84% working women in Saudi Arabia are in the government sector (Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, 2012) [86]. Despite the increases in women's educational attainment, they are suffering more from unemployment. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the rate rose from 25% in 2008 to 31% in 2010; women's rates of unemployment also increased in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These unemployment percentages may relate to families' preferences for specific occupations for their women in education and government sector.

Women in the Gulf countries are far from decision-making in public life, although these countries are totally integrated in the global economy (Aldabbagh and Grey, 2012). For example, statistics show that only 13% of Qatari women and 7% of Kuwaiti women are managers or senior management staff. The increase in the number of women with specialized scientific degrees does not seem to have influenced the number of women in leadership positions. Furthermore, under the 2004 permanent Qatar constitution, women were granted citizenship rights equal with men. Moreover, the Qatari 1998 electoral law of the municipal council affirms the rights of both men and women to run for public office. In the first election after this change, there were six Qatari women none of whom were elected. There was just one candidate in the second round of the Parliament elections of 2003 and the same was true for following cycles (See women and men report, 2012, Table 6-5, p. 63). In Bahrain's first election in

2006, one candidate won, which increased in 2011 to four. In Kuwait, women have had the right to participate in politics by 2005, and four women elected in 2006 Parliament election. In Saudi Arabia, there are no elections; however, in 2013, for the first time in history, the Saudi King appointed 30 women 150-member Shura council. The United Arab Emirates and Oman have made similar changes.

In fact, women’s participation in the public sphere is still far from reflecting their capabilities, suggesting that the gender gap is persisting. Two public surveys, in Qatar in 2007 and in Kuwait in 2005, concerned gender role differences. When the respondents were shown the restrictions on women’s participation in leadership positions and in politics, they stated that they believed women do not have the abilities and skills to participate in those roles. Moreover, there was little difference between women and men in that regard (Al-Ghanim and Fathel Al Rubaey, 2007; Glum, 2005) [6, 48]. Most of the recent efforts to empower women in the Arab region have been undertaken by governments. Non-governmental organizations have had limited roles in this matter. Most of the success stories of women’s empowerment are linked to educational attainment and labor force participation whereas political participation and integration into meaningful decision-making in these societies remain distant goals.

Methodology

Objective

This study aimed to identify public opinions about women’s rights and roles to reveal the extent to which people support these new rights roles in such society in transitions like Qatar society and the extent to which people use patterned norms and gendered expectations despite the modern demands of women’s daily lives.

Hypotheses

H1: No differences are expected to be found between females and males towards women new roles and right.

In Arab social structure people have more social statuses and authorities based on their gender. On these bases, we expected that gender leading to different attitudinal positions and male would be supportive to traditional gender roles because of the patriarchy culture.

H2: No differences based on age toward women roles.

We expected that the younger generations are more flexible than the older generation about gender roles. Since they are more subjective to the modernization program

H3: No differences based on education toward women rights and roles.

We assumes that the amount of educational attainment influence attitudes about women right and roles and the people with higher education will be more supportive to women new roles and rights.

Sampling frame

In this survey, the sampling frame which developed by the Social and Economic Research Institute (SESRI) consisted of Qatari nationals or citizens. All housing units in Qatar are listed in the sampling frame with the address and information that identifies the residents as Qataris, non-citizens, or labor migrants. This sampling method yields a valid probability sample. All of the adult members in the Qatari household

have the same chance of being sampled, and the probability of selecting each adult in the household is equal to the inverse of the number of adults regardless of the household size.

Sample Design

The state of Qatar is divided into seven administrative municipalities. Each municipality contains a number of zones and each zone is divided into several blocks. In the frame, there are 72 zones and 320 blocks. In this survey, housing units in each municipality were ordered by geographic location in order to permit well distributed sampling of housing units in different areas and then a systematic sample is constructed. The basic idea of systematic sampling is to select housing units by taking every k^{th} unit in the frame, where k is called the sampling step, which is the whole number part of the ratio between the frame size and the sample size. The systematic sampling implies that a proportionate stratification as a block containing a given percentage of Qatari housing units in the frame would be represented by the same percentage of the total number of sampled units.

In this survey, only one person 18 years or older in Qatari households is sampled for the survey. The interviewer asks the informant the first household adult contacted.

This sampling method yields a valid probability sample. All adult members in the household have the same chance of being sampled, and the probability of selecting each adult in the household is equal to the inverse of the number of adults regardless of the household size. The informant is only asked to respond to questions that are relatively simple, straightforward, and not intrusive. It is also a time - saving approach as most households are only asked one or two questions.

Sample size, non-response, and sampling error

In this survey, we decide on a sample size of 2,041 Qatari households. The following table shows the results of the last contact between interviewers and sampled housing units and persons in the survey. The table indicates the type of responses received for the sampled households.

Table 1: Responses by groups

Responses	Number
Completes	1,010
Not completes	1,031
Eligible	320
Ineligibles	454
Unknown eligibility	257
Raw response rate (RR1)	64%
Adjusted response rate (RR2)	66%

Based on table 1, response rates are calculated. We report two response rates. First, the raw response rate is the ratio between the number of completes and total sample sizes after excluding ineligibles: $RR1=C/(C+E+UE)$ where C is the number of completes, E is the number of eligible responses, and UE is the number of unknown eligibility. Second, the adjusted response rate is $RR2=C/(C+E+eUE)$ where e is the estimated proportion of eligibilities which is given by this expression $e=(C+E)/(C+E+IE)$ where IE is the number of ineligibles.

With the numbers of completes presented in table 5, the

maximum sampling error for a percentage is +/- 3.5 percentage points. The calculation of this sampling error takes into account the design effects (i.e., the effects from weighting and stratification).

Base weights

These weights are the inverse of the selection probability of the person in the sample. Because of proportionate stratified sampling, each household in the sample is self-weighted. That means an all housing units have the same chance of being selected and the weights are given by this formula:

$$W_{base}^{(housing\ unit)} = 1/p \text{ and } p = n/N$$

Where $W_{base}^{(housing\ unit)}$ is the base weight for the housing units, p is the probability of selection, n is the sample size, and N is the number of housing units in the frame. The weight for the selected person in the household is the above weight multiplied by the number of eligible persons in the household:

$$W_{base}^{person} = W_{base}^{(housing\ unit)} * h$$

Where h is the number of eligible persons in the household

Adjustment factors for non-response

If the responding and non-responding people are essentially similar with respect to the key subjects of the investigation, the base weights can be adjusted to account for the non-

response by this formula:

$$W_{person} = [\alpha W]_{base}^{person}$$

Where α is called the adjustment factor for non-response which is based on the propensity that a person is likely to complete the survey.

Weight calibration

The weights are also calibrated to make results in line with the population estimates based on the latest 2010 Census. This calibration can help reduce the effect from non-response and under-coverage of the sampling frame. SESRI uses “raking” method in the calibration to adjust the weights of the cases in the sample so that the proportions of the adjusted weights on certain characteristics agree with the corresponding proportions for the population.

Questionnaire development and survey administration

The survey instrument was a questionnaire that was designed to collect all of the information relevant to the analysis related to women’s roles in public life in Qatar. The questionnaire included eight sections, each of which contained statements that measured opinions about women’s rights and roles, grouped topically as shown in table 2.

The internal consistency and validity of the questionnaire was assessed. The value of the reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) was 0.84 and the value of the coefficient for the sincerity (Sq reliability coefficient) was 0.703. Thus, we are 70% confident that the results of this questionnaire are valid.

Table 2: Reliability test, cronbach’s alpha and item numbers (n = 1010)

Reliability Statistics			
S. No.		Cronbach's Alpha	No. of Items
1	Education	0.57	11
2	Marriage, Family & Gender Role	0.42	12
3	Economic Right & Work	0.23	11
4	Politics	0.72	10
5	Travel	0.45	4
6	Sport	0.52	6
7	Media	-0.22	4
8	Future	0.85	7
	All	0.84	65

It is clear from the results shown in the above table 2 that the value of Cronbach's alpha coefficient was high for all sections, ranging from (0.23, 0.85) in each. As well as the value of the coefficient alpha for the total statements of the questionnaire was (0.84) which makes the researcher quite confident about the validity of the analysis, results and testing hypotheses.

Results

Descriptive Statistics Reporting

The sample consists of 1010 Qatari citizens. The sample was about 54% men (546) and about 46% women (464). The average age was 38.8 years (SD = 13.862). However, all ages were represented in the sample. About 70% of the respondents were married and about 24% of the respondents had never been married. The average monthly income of participants was 27500 QR (25000 – 30000 average). The average children's of the participants was having four no.

children. Most of the respondents were educated and the women had higher educational attainment than men did. With respect to labor force participation, about 38% of the women and about 71% of the men were working.

The analysis found that the weighted average of all sections of the questionnaire was (3.50), which means that agreed was only according to Likert scale. This finding suggests that all of the respondents reported support for each of the education of women (3.93) and social roles in family (3.92). That was also the case regarding the importance of women’s roles for the future in Qatar (3.90). Although the labor market have changed, the analysis found that women’s economic rights and work were less supported (3.53); also, women’s freedom to travel (2.85), to work in the media (3.16), to participate in politics (3.21), and to play sports (3.26). These results suggest that some of the respondents have reservations about some roles and rights for women.

Table 3: Independent sample T-test for section’s total averages by gender (n = 1010)

Independent Samples Test	Levine’s Test		T-Test For Equality Of Means		
	Equality Of Variances		T	Df	Sig. (2-Tailed)
	F	Sig.			
Education	31.541	0	-10.525	1008	0.000
			-10.78	989.181	0.000
Marriage, Family, G Role	3.712	0.054	-7.962	1008	0.000
			-8.003	997.843	0.000
Women, Economic Right & Work	6.147	0.013	-5.034	1008	0.000
			-4.986	934.949	0.000
Women & Politics	3.683	0.055	-7.487	1008	0.000
			-7.529	999.33	0.000
Women & Travel	24.785	0	-9.403	1008	0.000
			-9.249	890.775	0.000
Gender & Sports	2.019	0.156	-3.587	1007	0.000
			-3.606	996.967	0.000
Women & Media	16.588	0	-2.878	1008	0.004
			-2.839	910.559	0.005
Women & Qatar's Future	39.797	0	-4.502	1007	0.000
			-4.6	996.81	0.000
Group Statistics					
	Gender	N	M	Sd	
Education	M	546	3.78	0.54	
	F	464	4.1	0.399	
Marriage, Family, G Role	M	546	3.82	0.427	
	F	464	4.03	0.401	
Women, Economic Right & Work	M	546	3.47	0.436	
	F	464	3.61	0.49	
Women & Politics	M	546	3.03	0.841	
	F	464	3.42	0.784	
Women & Travel	M	546	2.63	0.726	
	F	464	3.11	0.892	
Gender & Sports	M	546	3.19	0.763	
	F	463	3.35	0.715	
Women & Media	M	546	3.11	0.653	
	F	464	3.23	0.773	
Women & Qatar's Future	M	546	3.78	1.095	
	F	463	4.06	0.838	

The study revealed differences among the participants’ answers by gender for all axes, with a very high statistical significance (less than or equal to 0.000). The female participants in general are supportive to women in new social roles. The analysis also revealed noticeable differences between female and male perceptions about the importance of women’s roles to the society of the future: average (M = 3.23, SD = 0.773), average for females (M = 4.06, SD = 0.838), and average for males (M = 3.78, SD= 1.095).

Marriage

The results of the with-in analysis found some differences regarding marriage. For example, about 82% of the respondents agreed that women should be able to see their fiancés before the marriage and there were no statistically significant differences between men and women in this regard. However, the percentage of respondents that agreed

that women should be able to choose their own husbands was lower (49%) and the men were less likely (41%) than the women (59%) to agree. These results suggest that men are more likely than women to adhere to the traditional patriarchal values and the power over marriage and family decision-making that the kinship system gives to men. In support of this, about 83% of the respondents agreed that the fathers should have the right to prevent their daughters’ marriages when they do not approve of the fiancés. In this case, there were no statistically significant gender differences. Thus, although the social changes in Gulf families have influenced family size and functions, the distribution of power in the family remains in the hands of the men of the family, in accord with the norms of the kinship structure in which men enjoy higher status than women and the right to control the women in their kin groups.

Table 4: Attitudes toward women’s marriage, family and roles by gender; percentages in response categories, means, total means, and standard deviation (n = 1010).

	Gender	Strong-Disagree	Somewhat-Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat-Agree	Strong-Agree	Mean	Total Mean	SD
Primary Responsibility Should Be Family And Home	M	15	12	6	22	46	3.7	3.8	1.471
	F	11	12	4	22	52	3.9		
Qatari Women Should Choose Their Husbands	M	26	6	5	22	41	3.5	3.76	1.542
	F	8	10	2	21	59	4.1		
Qatari Women Should Help Manage Their Families' Financial Resources	M	11	10	7	32	40	3.8	4.07	1.243
	F	4	3	1	30	62	4.4		
Qatari Women Should Manage Their Own Inheritance	M	3	2	2	12	81	4.7	4.74	0.749
	F	0	2	1	7	90	4.8		
It's Better When The Wife Is Working	M	13	13	11	32	31	3.5	3.71	1.172
	F	4	14	5	42	35	3.9		
Qatari Women's Children Should Enjoy All Qatari Citizenship Rights	M	8	5	6	17	64	4.3	4.38	1.294
	F	5	3	2	11	78	4.5		
Qatari Women Should Marry Their First Cousins	M	47	23	14	9	8	2.1	2.06	1.307
	F	49	26	3	14	7	2		
Qatari Women Should Marry Men From Same Tribe	M	50	24	12	8	6	2	2.09	0.864
	F	42	29	2	18	9	2.2		
Qatari Women- Right To See Fiancées Before Marriage Contract	M	4	1	2	12	82	4.7	4.68	0.855
	F	3	2	1	12	82	4.7		
Qatari Women Should Participate In Family Decisions	M	4	4	2	30	60	4.4	4.56	0.742
	F	1	1	0	15	83	4.8		
Father's- Right To Prevent Their Daughters' Marriage	M	1	0	1	10	88	4.8	4.73	1.056
	F	3	3	2	15	78	4.6		
Brother's- Right To Prevent Their Sisters' Marriage	M	2	4	3	18	73	4.6	4.43	0.431
	F	7	8	0	22	63	4.3		

Women’s rights to work

The analysis found that, although the respondents supported women’s right to work, three of the statements have relatively low scores. One of the statements concerned women’s right to work and the respondents (70%) tended to favor the condition that women require their husbands’ permission. This study’s results found that male are relatively more likely than female to embrace stereotypical sex roles, and that neither age nor educational attainment matter to men’s attitudes in this regard. The results further found that respondents linked women’s right to work with their husbands’ consent because the majority of the respondents (65%) agreed that Qatari married women should work only when they have their husbands’ permission. Thus, women may not have the actual right to choose their occupations because the respondents evidenced reservations regarding that freedom men respondents with the statement, “primary responsibility for women should be family and home” (Table 4).

The results above also showed that females are supportive than males to that women priorities must be family

responsibilities. This results show that the females positions towards women new roles will be affected by family obligations.

Another important finding concerns the respondents’ attitudes about gender-mixed workplaces. About 50% of the men strongly disagreed with the statement that women can work in a gender-mixed workplace. This result was expected and it suggests that some Qatari men maintain the traditional cultural values that are rigid about gender segregation, values that tend to perceive women as objects. However, women respondents, particularly those with more education, were more positive than the men about gender-mixed workplaces, suggesting that women’s aspirations for work and economic advantages may encourage them to rise above certain restrictive values. Generally, the women respondents were more supportive than the men respondents to women entering new roles even though some new roles were not widely embraced by either, such as work in the media, as lawyers or judges, or military occupations (see Table 5).

Table 5: Attitudes toward women’s rights to work by gender; percentages in response categories, means, total means, and standard deviation (n = 1010)

	Gender	Strong-Disagree	Somewhat-Disagree	Neutral	Somewhat-Agree	Strong-Agree	Mean	Total Mean	SD
Qatari Women Should Be Free To Work In Any Career	M	22	11	5	28	35	3.4	3.93	1.41
	F	2	5	1	24	68	4.5		
Qatari Women Should Be Free To Work In Gender-Mixed Workplaces	M	50	12	9	23	6	2.3	2.73	1.594
	F	26	10	3	32	30	3.3		
Only Certain Jobs Are Suitable For Qatari	M	7	7	3	20	63	4.2	4.02	1.373

Women	F	15	12	0	30	43	3.8		
Nowadays Qatari Women Have Same Employment Opportunities	M	8	7	4	22	59	4.2	4.1	1.306
	F	10	10	1	27	51	4		
Qatari Women Should Stop Working When They Have Children	M	31	23	11	23	12	2.6	2.52	1.416
	F	37	27	4	8	8	2.4		
Married Qatari Women Should Work Only If They Have Permission From Husbands	M	6	6	3	16	70	4.4	4.2	1.34
	F	16	7	1	17	59	4		
Qatari Women Should Not Work In The Private Sector	M	35	21	8	18	18	2.6	2.65	1.58
	F	37	19	3	19	22	2.7		
Work Of Married Qatari Women At Expense Of Their Children's Time	M	22	15	5	28	30	3.3	3.24	1.55
	F	23	16	3	33	24	3.2		
Qatari Women Should Have The Right To Own Private Businesses	M	8	3	3	21	65	4.3	4.44	1.047
	F	2	3	1	22	71	4.6		
Comfortable To Have A Qatari Woman As My Supervisor	M	41	12	8	22	16	2.6	2.92	1.651
	F	24	15	3	19	38	3.3		
Men Are Better Managers Than Women	M	6	6	10	17	61	4.2	4.14	1.282
	F	9	10	4	19	56	4.1		

Women and leadership in work

The results of this study highlight another important aspect of Qataris’ attitudes toward women, which is leadership and political roles and as a Judge in the public sphere, which might explain why women’s participation in leadership positions remains low. (See table 5). There was no difference between male and female about these roles, suggesting that

these roles are not in sex role domain and there are cultural restrictions on women roles as a leader or judge. This finding supports the results of a previous study in 2007 (Al-Ghanim 2007) [6]. The continuation of these attitudes interferes with efforts to empower women in leadership positions in Qatar and indicate the important of cultural domain in empowerment policies.

Table 6: Attitudes toward women’s political participation by gender; percentages in response categories, means, total means, and standard deviation (n = 1010).

	Gender	St. Disagree	Somwhat Disagree	Neutral	Somwhat Agree	St. Agree	Mean	Total Mean	SD
Qatari women should serve in ministerial positions	M	30	14	7	26	23	3	3.38	1.586
	F	13	10	2	27	47	3.9		
Support Qatari women in Prime Minister position	M	56	14	7	12	12	2.1	2.56	1.644
	F	30	13	3	21	31	3.1		
Support Qatari women in judge position	M	53	10	5	16	16	2.3	2.3	1.609
	F	55	11	2	15	17	2.3		
More Qatari women should work as lawyers	M	22	10	6	31	31	3.4	3.74	1.433
	F	7	5	1	38	49	4.2		
Qatari women should work as policewomen	M	19	7	5	38	31	3.5	3.53	1.514
	F	21	10	2	30	37	3.5		
Qatari women should be appointed in diplomatic posts	M	33	12	7	29	20	2.9	3.21	1.588
	F	18	11	2	31	36	3.6		
Qatari women should participate in political activities just as men do	M	32	15	7	26	21	2.9	3.04	1.592
	F	25	14	1	33	27	3.2		
Qatari women should consult husbands when they vote in elections	M	26	11	4	15	44	3.4	3.46	1.709
	F	27	7	1	18	47	3.5		
More Qatari women should run for municipal council elections	M	29	10	7	29	24	3.1	3.26	1.592
	F	22	10	2	31	35	3.5		
Will choose male candidates over female candidates	M	15	9	13	17	46	3.7	3.59	1.494
	F	16	15	11	22	36	3.5		

H2 No differences based on age toward women roles

The analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) performed on these data found statistically significant differences between older and younger respondents at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. Specifically, the older respondents agreed than younger respondents with statements regarding the participation of women in education, family, work, politics,

and travel. The younger respondents were more in agreement with statements about the media. These results do not support the general notion that younger people are supportive of women new roles and suggest that greater efforts toward changing young people’s convictions about women’s rights should be made.

Table 7: ANOVA test for respondent’s age and sections total averages (n = 1010).

Anova- Respondent’s Age				
		Df	F	Sig.
Women & Education	Between	6	4.919	0.000
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Marriage, Family & G Role	Between	6	2.321	0.031
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Economic Right & Work	Between	6	5.821	0.000
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Politics	Between	6	4.621	0.000
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Travel	Between	6	1.816	0.093
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Sport	Between	6	1.039	0.398
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Media	Between	6	1.444	0.195
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		
Future	Between	6	3.445	0.002
	Within	1002		
	Total	1008		

“Analysis of variance showed a main effect of Age on respondent’s agreements with women education, $F(6,1002) = 4.919$, $p < .001$. women marriage, family & gender role, $F(6,1002) = 2.231$, $p = .031$. Women economic right & work $F(6,1002) = 5.821$, $p < .001$. women politics, $F(6,1002) = 4.621$, $p < .001$. women future, $F(6,1002) = 3.445$, $p = .002$.

Table 8: ANOVA test for respondent’s education level and sections total averages (n = 1010).

Anova- Respondents Education Level				
		Df	F	Sig.
Women & Education	Between	7	1.827	0.079
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Marriage, Family & G Role	Between	7	7.536	0.000
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Economic Right & Work	Between	7	7.724	0.000
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Politics	Between	7	5.217	0.000
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Travel	Between	7	3.257	0.002
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Sport	Between	7	1.682	0.110
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Media	Between	7	0.593	0.762
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		
Future	Between	7	1.65	0.118
	Within	1002		
	Total	1009		

H 3 No differences based on education toward women rights and roles

“Analysis of variance showed a main effect of education-level on respondent’s agreements about women marriage, family & gender role, $F(7,1002) = 7.536$, $p < .001$. women economic right & work, $F(7,1002) = 7.724$, $p < .001$. women politics, $F(7,1002) = 5.217$, $p < .001$. women travel, $F(7,1002) = 3.257$, $p = .002$. Analysis indicated that agreements were more for participants with low education level in women marriage, family & gender section and women economic rights & work section where they support women house responsibilities and linked restrict women right to choose husbanded and work with father and husband agreement. While, agreements were more for participants with high education level in women participation in politics section and women travel section.

Discussion

The majority of studies on women’s status in the Gulf region have concluded that educational attainment, particularly college education, fundamentally influences women’s roles. Al munajjed (1997) argued that educational attainment has given Saudi women access to the labor force and the notion that women are working has modified traditional gender norms. Many scholars of the Arab region have made similar claims (Al Mutawa, 2002; Hafiz, 2010; Hassan, 2007; Krause, 2009) [15, 49, 53]. According to the results of these studies, educational attainment leads to major changes in women’s social status and increases gender equality in the Arab region. However, most of these studies drew these conclusions without empirical verification in the contexts in which there are indications that women are still far from gender equality. Shallal, (2011) [82] indicated that People use their understanding of gender roles as standards to judge women’s behaviors and role compliance in public situations and positions, such as businesses, professions, and in leadership roles in civil society.

The results of this study found that the respondents supported women’s right to education regardless of the respondent’s educational attainment. Also, the women respondents reported higher expectations regarding education’s ability to improve women’s societal position, particularly with respect to financial independence. This finding suggests that educational attainment may not influence attitudes toward women, particularly men’s attitudes toward normative women’s roles and women’s economic, social, and political participation.

The results showed also that women’s roles and power within families: Partnership or subordination still not change and are not effected by, the changes in the family size and education or age although of the social change what we expected that have impact on the people norms and gender roles culture. This result suggests that women in the region see themselves through their roles of wife and mother. Thus, although labor force participation may provide economic independence and jobs for women may be available, cultural norms prioritize women’s family roles for married women (Spierings *et al.*, 2010) [85]. It is reasonable to conclude that educational attainment and employment has helped women to make important achievements, although their ability to make independent decisions is limited, implying that Gulf woman

face generalized contradictions with respect to their gender roles.

Another important finding concerns the respondents' attitudes about gender-mixed workplaces. Men strongly disagreed with the statement that women can work in a gender mixed workplace. This result was expected and it suggests that some Qatari men maintain the traditional cultural values that are rigid about gender segregation, values that tend to perceive women as objects. However, women respondents, particularly those with more education, were more positive than men about gender-mixed workplaces, suggesting that women's aspirations for work and economic advantages may encourage them to rise above certain restrictive values.

Women and leadership in work

The results of this study highlight another important aspect of Qataris' attitudes toward women, which is leadership roles in the public sphere, which might explain why women's participation in leadership positions remains low. The findings revealed low support for Qatari women as leaders or supervisors because 59% of the respondents reported that men are better managers. There was no difference between women and men in their attitudes about this aspect of women's roles, suggesting that women are part of the problem. This finding supports the results of a previous study in (2007 Al Ghanim)^[6]. The continuation of these attitudes interferes with efforts to empower women in leadership positions.

Women and politics

About 47% of the respondents strongly agreed that, "a woman should have her husband's permission when she intends to vote in elections" and women were more likely than men to agree (65% versus 59%, respectively) (See table 1). However, there was less support for the idea that women can be judges (32%) and there was no statistically significant difference by gender. The respondents also supported women traveling about (in public) only when accompanied by Mahram (one of her family men). There also was greater disagreement than agreement with the statement that, "more Qatari women should be on television." These attitudes conflict with women's abilities to self-govern and to be integrated into the society-wide developmental processes in the Arab region. They further suggest that women's self-perceptions are tied to the opportunities and constraints that are set for them by their families and communities.

Generational differences in attitudes toward gender roles

The analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) performed on these data found statistically significant differences between older and younger respondents at the 0.05 level of statistical significance. Specifically, the older respondents were more in agreement than younger respondents with statements regarding the participation of women in education, family, work, politics, and travel. The younger respondents were more in agreement with statements about the media. These results do not support the general notion that younger people are supportive of women and suggest that greater efforts toward changing young people's convictions about women's rights should be made.

Conclusion

The results of this study revealed low support for some roles

for women. Some of the attitudes seem to be related to the traditional norms of gender roles that are generated by the kinship system that dominates in the Arab region. The respondents seem to have used the patterned norms of rights and roles in the extended family to identify their attitudes. This tendency seems to be stronger in the men, who adhered to their traditional rights to control the women in their families.

Although the respondents tended to agree with statements supporting women's rights to education and labor force participation, they also maintained attitudes that supported the rights of the family, particularly fathers, brothers, and husbands, to prevent women from labor force participation and to choose their own occupations. These attitudes are consistent with their socialization regarding gender. The norms of gender roles apparently are strong and associated with the attitude that women belong to the men in their families and that they are subject to the men's authority. The patriarchal culture in the Arab region continues to pattern gender roles despite the advances made by globalization and modernization.

These results also suggest that the social meanings of gender roles are present for men as well as women, found in the results regarding respondents' attitudes toward women entering new roles. Many of the respondents agreed with statements that certain fields (namely, the media) are unsuitable for women because women's work in that field would harm the family's reputation and oppose traditions. That attitude also applies to women's participation in literary and cultural life unless women disguise themselves as men by writing under a pen name. In patriarchal cultures such as the Arab cultures, the family name is a man's name, husband or father, and when a woman uses her pre-marriage name, she merely reverts to her father's name, which is the name of all of the men in that kinship group. This use of male lineage is a primary characteristic of patriarchal cultures in the Arab region and around the world. Thus, although women's roles have expanded beyond the household, women's labor force participation remains limited to work in public institutions. The attitudes that agree that women should be working only in the home still affect women's freedom to engage in society and keep the traditional gender differences intact. Thus, women's participation is controlled to some extent and their ability to contribute to society is reduced.

In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that people develop attitudes about women's roles and rights based on the gender roles that are generated by the kinship structure and relations in which they live their lives. These attitudes encompass the household and the public sphere to determine the extent of women's labor force participation, limit their involvement in leadership positions, and dampen their abilities to access power. As the results of this study demonstrate, women have aspirations for more freedoms and rights than they currently enjoy; but, when they face the cultural reality of resistance to those freedoms and rights, they surrender to the patriarchal system and authority. Thus, educational attainment, financial independence, and age offer only limited support to their abilities to choose and act on their own decisions.

This study highlights the most important social aspects in which women in the region are encountering resistance to change to their traditional gender roles. Because there is continued resistance in the context of ongoing modernization,

further and consistent research would make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the complex adaptation of the Arab region to global progress. At the family level, there are issues related to the family partnership and, at the community level, there are questions about the effectiveness of laws that support women's ability to achieve stability and balance between their family responsibilities and labor force participation.

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