



Analyzing the trends of various kinds of political interactions between bakhtiari tribe and reza shah's government (From 1921's Coup to 1929)

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Abstract

After Reza Khan entered the Iranian political scene with the coup of 1299 AH, with the support of foreign colonial governments, especially England, he tried to form a centralized top-down regime in Iran. In order to achieve its goals, the Reza Khan government had to destroy the semi-independent tribal governments. One of these tribal governments was the semi-independent Bakhtiari tribe which had to be abolished. In fact, the political power of the semi-independent government of Bakhtiari was one of the semi-independent political governments during the decentralized rule of the Qajar Empire. In such a situation, the semi-independent Bakhtiari government and the centralized government of Reza Shah faced each other. The political

Relations between Reza Shah's government and the semi-independent government of Bakhtiari tribe from the coup of 1299 to 1309 were often based on political conflict based on peaceful nonviolent cooperation with appeasement. This study is a descriptive-analytical historical study using library resources, documents, archives. The main purpose of this article is to answer the question of what kind of political conflict was based on the type of political interactions with the Bakhtiari government from the coup of 1299 AH to 1309 AH. Were those relations more military and violent?

Keywords: bakhtiari tribe, central government, reza shah, political conflicts, incentive politics

1. Introduction

Although the study of tribes and states has long been a preserve of Middle Eastern interest in anthropologists, historians and political scientists have always had more than a marginal the role of tribes in the construction of major political systems and institutions. The focus on tribes and state formation in a Middle Eastern context is significant for at least two reasons. First, for long periods of history large parts of the Middle East were not effectively dominated by the imperial states that otherwise ruled the region. Although tribes played a significant role in the creation (and, with some exceptions, disintegration) of such Islamic empires as the Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Ottoman, Safavid, and Qajar states, they also populated and dominated at various times vast areas of the Middle East that did not come under effective Islamic imperial authority; such areas included the Iranian and Turkish plateaus, the Syrian desert, the Arabian Peninsula, the Upper Nile, and the deserts, mountains, and plateaus of North Africa. Only since the mid-nineteenth century have tribal populations in these areas begun to be incorporated, at different speeds and with different rhythms, into the modern states that grew up in the Middle East and North Africa. But, tribes did not necessarily cease to exist because states were formed. Even when tribal forces contributed to the formation of states in regions as different as Iran and Morocco, they might remain much as they were in spite of state formation or they might just as easily become different kinds of tribal entities. In fact, it was not uncommon for the very process of state formation to encourage already existing tribes to reach an accommodation with the state authority in order to retain

their autonomy or to create new tribes that might organize themselves around other, more dynamic loyalties, especially those associated with ethnicity, thereby enabling them to oppose the state and even seek independence from it (Khoury, Kostiner, 1991:5).

Syed Farid al-Attas of Carpathian states that most of the Middle East-related writings and analyzes emphasize the role of external factors and motivation such as European industrialization, which has led scholars to disregard the role of internal factors in the Middle East. Al-Attas believes that the common denominator of studies on Turkey and Iran goes back to the neglect of a particular internal factor in Ottoman-Iranian history, namely the problem of nomadic tribes and nomads; Nikki Keddie, one of the leading scholars related to Iran, states that clear and serious studies of the role of the Tribes and nomads in the history of the Middle East in general and in the history of Iran are not found in particular (Al-attas, 1998: 63). Several theoretical approaches have relied on the method of historical sociology in Iran, with almost none of them addressing the issue of tribes and tribes as a powerful social, political, cultural force that has played a role in centuries of government, or at least a brief mention. And they were stereotyped and negative. In fact, in the general case, only the multi-factor hybrid approach and the Marxist-influenced approach, especially the theorists influenced by Wittfogel's Eastern despotism theory, refer to the position of the Tribes and nomads in Iran in a very concise, ideological way. These theoretical approaches are as follow:

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1. The view of Eastern tyranny: This view is influenced by Hegel and Marx's approach to Eastern history, and in

- particular Marx's explanation of Asian production. For Marx, Eastern society is a scattered and fragmented society. This geographical determinism determines the political and social history of the East. In the twentieth century, Perry Anderson and Wittfogel developed this theory. In Iranian studies, Katoozian^[1], main figure in this paradigm
2. Marxian perspective: In Marxian studies the issue of feudalism and class conflict plays a major role in explaining Iran's social history. Abbas Wali is a serious figure in the development of this approach in understanding Iran
 3. Multi-Factor Combined Approaches: Due to the shortcomings of the single-factor approaches, multifactorial analysis focuses on foreign policy, international politics and colonialism in understanding social change while focusing on geographical determinism. Ashraf, varassani, Foran and Nikki Keddie can be included in this category.
 4. Phenomenological, Conceptual and Cultural Approaches to Iranian History: Teda Scotch Bull, Raja'i Farhang (Referring to the Iranian Identity River), and Syed Javad Tabatabai (With Iranshahr theory) are among the most important scholars in this field.
 5. Postmodern Approaches and Discourse Analysis: In this approach, emphasis is placed on discursive discursive understandings of Iran; for example, the works of Kachuyan can be mentioned.

In Iran, tribes and nomads are amongst the important social and political forces that have played essential roles in the three pre-modern, early modern and contemporary social formations of the sociopolitical life of Iran country in different forms and styles in such a way that the history of it can be realized as an epoch of role-playing by thousands of tribes and nomads and clans in various grounds and aspects. In a general glance, the tribes served three primary political, economic and military functions for the governments (Ghorbanpour Dashtaki, 2011, pp.10-11). The tribes and the nomad people have severe, traditional, and coherent loyalties, what kind of tribal solidarity or thing that is named by Ibn Khaldun as, "*asabiyya*". The social force of such associations mostly stem from the familial bonds, territorial integrity and common business as well as from sorrows, cheers, raids and shared defenses. By modernization and its intensifying crystallization in different spheres such as expansion of schools, literacy, recently broadcasting media (cultural dimension); expansion of the factories and industrial work market and entry of the nomadic individuals into the new and clerical jobs (industrial dimension); solidification of the political power, creation of modern army, construction of modern political institutions like

congress, law, military service^[2]. (political dimension); and intensively revolutionized expansion of urbanization and geographical and social mobility (social dimension) development. In fact, it was with the emergence of such a concept as the nationalist ideology and reduction of constitutionalism to economic growth and formation of a unit Farsist^[3]. national government that the management method relying on the heads of nomads and tribes and the semi-autonomous governance by them was envisioned as a barrier and problem in the face of the unit national government's nationalism discourse which concentrated on economic growth and had to be destroyed by any possible means (Kroni, 2007, p.18 and Rahbari, 2000, p.26). The western capitalism system saw its socioeconomic interests in the transformation of the tribal communities and non-centralized feudalist governments into urban communities^[4]. As well as centralized government in Iran. The political actions by the tribes and nomadic forces' uprising and riots in Iran were realized amongst the hindrances to the growth in capitalism, democracy and formation of a modern government in Iran (Atayov, 1987, p.11).

2. Statement of the problem

During the early modernization in Iran and after 1920's coup, Reza Shah^[5]. was incumbently coerced to confront and engage in the semi-autonomous traditional peripheral powers like tribes and, in fact, the government's way of treating the various tribes is enumerated amongst one of the most important historical properties of the contemporary Iran. Bakhtiari Tribe is one of the most important clans in the southern regions of the country and it is amongst the tribes that though having had a great deal of effect on the contemporary politics of Iran, its political interactions with the government has been less frequently analyzed and explored in scientific and empirical forms (see also Kronin, 2014, pp.360-361). Some studies, as well, have been conducted pivoting about the nationalism discourse and giving originality to the "government" and considering tribes as "others" and reduced various interactions by the tribes to negative actions and described them using negative words and as invaders^[6].

The study is based on a historical sociological question

1. Have the political relations between the government of Reza Shah with the Bakhtiari tribe since the coup of 1299 AH to 1307 AH been more based on interaction and cooperation?.

¹Some books by these authors: Mohammad Ali Katouzian: State And Society In Iran - The Eclipse Of The Qajars And The Emergence Of The Pahlavis (2006), Abbas Vali: Modes of production in pre-capitalist Iran: Reflections on Abbas Vali's pre-capitalist Iran: A theoretical history(1993), Ahmad Ashraf: Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran(1969), varassani: State and government in Iran during the period of capitalist colonial domination (colonial mode of production - class attached to capitalist colonialism)(2011), Nikki R Keddie Qajar Iran and the rise of Reza Khan, 1796-1925(1999), Raja'i Farhang: The Problem of Iranian Identity Today: Role in an Age of Multiculturalism(2018), Syed Javad Tabatabai: Reflections on Iran Volume 1 and 2 (2002, 2008), Kachuyan: Our identity(2012).

² For example, it was with the occurrence of constitutionalism movement that five of the largest tribes in the country, namely Shahsavan, Ghashghai, Khamseh, Turkman and Bakhtiari, were granted this legal right to send their own specific representatives to the national consultative assembly (Lambton, 1983, p.232) and each of these nomads and tribes did so and dispatched their own specific representatives to the national consultative assembly (Nasiri Tayyebi, 1909, p.100).

³ Farsist means sectorial or local governors (p.406)

⁴ Taghi, Azad Armaki and Sayed Ghasem Hasani, (2016), "an analysis of the historical metamorphosis from nomadic to tribal in Ghashghai", cultural and tourism heritage research center, first round, 2(2)

⁵ Reza Shah was installed as the minister in the ministry of war in 1921 and was appointed as Iran's prime minister in 1923; he became the king of Iran after dethroning Ahmad Shah Qajar in 1925 (Eberling, 2014, p.178).

⁶ Hamad Ashraf (1981) Historical Barriers to the Growth of Capitalism in Iran: The Qajar Period. Tehran: *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Rise of the Pahlavis*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, paperback edition, 2006 (original edition, 2000).

3. Background of the study

So far, numerous studies^[7] have been performed regarding Bakhtiari tribe by the historians, researchers and experts in social and political sciences from various historical, geographical, anthropological and sociological perspectives. In general, the studies performed about Bakhtiari Tribe have been lacking the theoretical background and sociological analysis and have mostly served descriptive, historical, anthropological, itinerary-writing and diary-writing purposes. Some researchers have been largely concentrated on the tribal structure of Bakhtiaris, their relationships with the English men as well as the role of Bakhtiaris in constitutionalism. The studies performed about the study subject and its temporal span, i.e. the relations between the Bakhtiaris and Reza Shah's government, have been substantially concentrated on the police-like military policy and mechanism and the war between Bakhtiaris and Reza Shah. These studies have less frequently dealt with the other mechanisms that the parties, i.e. Reza Shah's government, on the one hand, and Bakhtiaris, on the other hand, have applied in their political relations^[8].

4. Methodology

Historical Sociology As a hybrid branch and interdisciplinary field, the intersection of the two sciences is history and sociology.

In fact, the sociology of the former societies, based on historical documents and reports, is a relatively young member of the social science family and one of the most successful disciplines in the social sciences.

In historical sociology, the study of social phenomena is based on data, information, analysis and historical studies. It should be noted that this is a two-way stream of influence between sociology and the science of history. History also uses analyzes, approaches, models, methods, and theories of the social sciences. Thus, when a sociologist goes beyond the full attention of existing structures, "historical sociology" emerges, and when a historian avoids the mere reporting of historical events and personal affairs, "the co-operation of history and social theory" is formed.

As Ibn Khaldun puts it - and sociologists now insist that the sociology of history must be descriptive and analytical; that is, it must show why and how societies formed, expanded, and changed (Kafi, Majid, 2005: 49-51)

The present study investigated the political interactions that have been based on encouraging policies by Reza Shah's government in respect to Bakhtiari Tribe in the temporal span after 1920's coup, i.e. from the time of Reza Khan's entry into Iran's political scene till the end of Reza Shah's rule. The current research paper has been conducted based on a descriptive-analytical sociological method; the main data collecting method was library and document research. The documents used herein were mostly secondary library resources.

7 For example: Siahpour: 2007, Sinai: 2007, Raie Glouje: 2009, Bagheri, Ghobad, Garthwaite: 2009, Hosseini: 2010, Abtahi: 2001, Ghanbari:2006

8 A sample of the studies conducted about Bakhtiari Tribe has been presented below:

Allahyari *et al* (2011), "analytical investigation of the structure of the political-social power in Bakhtiari Tribe from Qajar till the Islamic Revolution"; Hosseini (2010), "Bakhtiaris in Isfahan: the reasons and qualities of Isfahan's seizure by Bakhtiari Tribe in the course of constitutionalism revolution"; Gartevite, (1994), "the sociopolitical history of Bakhtiaris"; Gartevite, (1996), "Bakhtiaris in the mirror of history" and so on.

Library Documents and Resources This study used the of the library of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran in Tehran and the National Library of Iran in Tehran and the University of Tehran and Yasuj and Shiraz University.

The study method's validation has been obtained through referring to different resources, communication with individuals informed about the study subject, referring to Bakhtiari individuals and establishing logical relationship between the data recognition and analysis as well as finally staying away from any sort of value-based judgment.

4.1 The important concepts and expressions of the study

In the central and southern Zagros live the Bakhtiaris, groups that speak Luri a language closely related to Persian (Farsi). They are concentrated in an area extending southward from Lorestan Province to Khuzestan Province and westward from Esfahan to within eighty kilometers of the present-day Iraqi border. A pastoral nomadic tribe called Bakhtiari can be traced back in Iranian history to as early as the fourteenth century but the important Bakhtiari tribal confederation dates only from the nineteenth century. Historically the Bakhtiaris were divided into two main tribal groups. The Chahar Lang were located in the northwest of the Bakhtiari country and until the middle of the nineteenth century retained the leadership of all the Bakhtiari tribes. The Haft Lang the southwestern group were more closely associated with modern Iranian politics than the Chahar Lang and in some instances have exercised significant influence. By the time Reza Shah came to power, Bakhtiari's population was estimated^[9]. at around 50,000 (Karimi, 2002, pp.488-489 and Mirza'ei Darreh Shuri, 1994, pp.81-82, Rashidvash, 2013, pp.211). The political-social structure of the Bakhtiari Tribe has been as outlined in the following words: 1) tribe; 2) branch; 3) clan; 4) race; 5) order; 6) descendants; 7) group; and 8) family.

In the past, the governance was based on the ethnical and tribal unity and relied on the tribe's traditions in the political structure of Bakhtiaris. A Khan or Haj Khan was on the top of the tribe's power. Tribe's khan was the highest rank in the tribe with his appointment being ordered and announced by the central government (Safijad, 2001, p.160). After the Khan, tribe's. Supervisor followed by sheriff, chieftain, elder and finally "Sarmal" or "gapmal"^[10]. " [Supervisor] were the next ranks in an order of importance.

5. Collective political action

Collective political actions are challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in interaction with elites and authorities (Tarrow, 1998: p. 4). This definition includes two key elements that deserve some elaboration. First, collective political actions are challenges. They concern disruptive direct action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes. There is an obvious reason why this is the case. Collective political action is typically staged by people who lack access to politics. Had they had access there would have been no need for the action. Disruption forces authorities to pay attention to the claims brought forward. Second, it concerns people with a common purpose and solidarity. Participants rally behind common claims;

⁹ Kave Bayat (1987).

¹⁰ In the political organization of Bakhtiari Tribe, Sarmal or Gapmal is a title given to a clan's head. Gapmal is usually selected by the households of the family member of Mal (Camp) and usually from amongst the oldest men (Amir Ahmadian, 2004, p.57).

they want authorities to do something, to change a state of affair or to undo changes. Such common claims are rooted in feelings of collective identity and solidarity. If these challenges gain sustainability, they constitute a social movement.

6. Political interaction

There are three approaches to the issue of political interaction. 1) Interaction oriented approach 2) Conflict approach 3) A combination of interaction and conflict approach. In general, these three approaches can be divided into two completely separate forms: Disagreement and Conflict on the one hand, and Compromise on the other.

A typical political [11] decision," they argue, "either implicitly or explicitly involves an element of exchange; that is, an individual has to give up something in order to get something. The thing given up is a cost and the thing obtained leads to a reward. More concisely, we may define political exchanges as those consisting in the mutual flows of costs and rewards between and among political actors. In other words, a political relationship is characterized by the same processes as other social relationships, the only difference being in the kinds of goods exchanged. The notion of exchanges is clearly related to the behavior of the actors (the giving of costs and rewards). There are clearly other types of political relationships which are not based upon exchanges—namely conflict and force (coercion). Positive reinforcers maintain the behavior of both persons. "Coercion," on the other hand, refers to interaction in which aversive stimuli control the behavior of one person and positive reinforcers maintain the behavior of the other. Both "reciprocity" and "coercion" are held to be stable patterns of interaction. Political relationships, in short, can be described in terms of positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and coercion. The operational definition of these patterns, it should be noted, is based upon the behavior of the actors, not their goals. Negative reciprocity. In this situation the conflict occurs as a result of the absence of exchanges. Ongoing disputes cannot be resolved, and if increasingly punitive behavior is undertaken, then the likelihood of escalation is increased.

7. Study's theoretical foundations

This study focuses on the relationship between Bakhtiari tribe and Reza Shah government, based on the theory of nation-state and the mechanisms used between the parties in their political relations with each other.

The political organization of the modern world has been formed about the concept "state-nation". If modernity is considered as a whole composed of various elements and axes; its economic dimension is capitalism, its social dimension is urbanization and individualism, its cultural dimension is secularism, scientism and instrumental intellectuality and its political dimension is the modern state-nation.

According to Max Weber, capitalism is an essential pillar of the modern state's formation. Capitalism forms a monetary economy that exerts a key effect on the transition from the medieval supporter-winning relations as the factor always

having given rise to the segmentation of the central government's power.

State-nation building is a process in the course of which a group tries obtaining autonomy, political solidarity, independence, destruction of the independent powers existing in a given political geography and the independence required for advancing its goals via overtaking the power in that geography and bringing about fundamental institutional development. Such goals are largely dependent on the elevation of social-national association and integration and political stability, especially in the concept of the democratic institutions' development. The vanguard and/or somehow the central signifier and the primary orientation of such a stream is the maximal expansion and evolution of the government (as a robust institutional structure) and nation (as an integrated social structure featuring an identical identity) as well as interlacing and interweaving these two aspects to the maximum possible extent (Ghavam and Zargar, 2009, p.18) in such a way that the state and the nation are imagined as interwoven and inseparable from the perspective of the internal and external observers. In clearer terms, the shaped nation is observed as a special integrated and uniform nation from the perspective of the onlookers and the established political government is viewed by the nation as a domestic and friendly state.

In a historical approach generally based on various examples of state-nation construction, four models can be pointed out in regard of the process of state-nation construction

1. The model of nation-building's precedence to state-building:

This model specifically belonged to Europe. Based on this model, a nation is first born and a state belonging to it is secondarily created for it. In fact, based on this model, the state-nation construction moves through a natural historical process and it is domestically born and moves towards perfection.

2. The model of state-building's precedence to nation-building

Conversely to the first model, this model has been copied from the US's experience. Unlike the European model, the existence of the state precedes the existence of nation in the American model meaning that the Europeans migrated to the US and carried along their progresses in the area of governance and its related institutions thereto and state-building underwent a lot of advances.

3. The model of international state-nation building

In this regard, the efforts for creating a state and a nation within a given political geography are mostly shaped by the foreign states, especially the western governments with a special purpose. In fact, the planning or the supportive force is sourced from outside the main factor of the state-nation formation in a territorial geography in this model which can also be called the international state-nation construction or outsourced state-nation construction and/or, in other words, imperialistic nation-building.

4. State-nation building in eastern Europe or the nationalizing government model

This model was taken into account in relation to political geography of Eastern Europe and regions separated from

¹¹ Patterns of Political Interaction: Reciprocity and Coercion Author(s): Robert M. Jackson (1973). Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association.

Soviet Union. The emphasis in this model is on the idea that the model of state-nation construction cannot be coercively applied in a linear approach for Western Europe and the US and the communities existing in these regions, rather a special model has to be proposed and investigated according to the capacities of these regions (Ghavam and Zargar, 2009, pp.34-35).

The third type of nation-building can be applied to Iran. In fact, with the coup d'état of 1299, the Qajar empire was overthrown with the support and planning of the British and Soviet governments, and Reza Khan, with their direct and indirect support, entered the Iranian political scene, eventually^[12]. Completing the project of the coup of 1299 AH. In 1304 he officially became King of Iran. With the backing of the British and Soviet governments and Persian intellectuals, he put forward the plan of establishing a modern nation-state based on Aryan Persian archaic nationalism in Iran. Reza Shah's government used various methods, tools, and mechanisms to achieve this plan. The use of political mechanisms and strategies between the tribes and the Reza Shah government has ranged from soft and peaceful to hard military. How these strategies are applied depends on different factors and different durations of Reza Shah,

The concept "interaction" has been derived of the root "action" as stated in the lexicological resources which means work, deed, behavior, dealing, reacting, bargaining and transacting and establishing relationship between two or several persons (Ehsani, 2015, pp.12-13). The interaction between the sociopolitical power's centers and forces means that their actions influence their behaviors. Nowadays, the social interaction has a well-developed meaning and it is applied in the political, social, scientific, cultural and ethical relations (Rajabi, 2009, p.17).

Political interactions can be divided into three approaches as mentioned in the following words: 1) purely interactive; 2) purely confrontational; and 3) combinatorial interactive-confrontational. Of course, all three types of these policies can be imagined in a political space, the essential attribute of which is conflict and dispute between the political parties over the resources and decision-makings' limits.

Weber recounts "competition" as a sort of peaceful dispute and reasons that the competing individuals and groups usually endeavor to take control of the opportunities and privileges in which others are interested without using physical violence (Weber, 1995, pp.44-47). Zimmel defined dispute as being incorporative of a vast spectrum of social relations and interactions, including violent and peaceful that are shaped inside the cycle of the conflicts and inconsistencies between individuals and groups. Zimmel generally believes in two states for the social relations and interactions: dispute and conciliation. He deploys both of them against "indifference" indicating the absence of the relationship and interaction between the individuals and groups (Zimmel, 1976, p.175).

"Darandov" defined conflict as "the deployment of the social roles against one another". He considered dispute as a permanent issue inside all the ideally organized social groups, including small ones like family and large ones like formal organizations, government and national society.

According to him, the apparently cooperation-based relations and actions are soaked in the dispute (Delavari, 2004).

Coser realized dispute as a sort of battle over values or claims related to power, position and the other rare resources and stated that "the groups engaged in dispute are not solely seeking for achieving their own interested and favorite values but they are looking for ways to neutralize the rivals' interventions or damaging or destroying them".

Jonathan Turner considered dispute as a set of incidents that "lead to degrees of mutual vivid violence at least between two groups". In other words, Turner realized dispute "as a process in the course of which two or several groups engage in the exhibition of sorts of actions and reactions over the disputed interests and values and this eventually drags them towards violent operations against one another" (Turner, 1982, p.82).

Karl Devich embedded purposeful competitions in the area of dispute; in other words, he stated that the parties of a dispute should be aware of the competitive status existent amongst them. Based on a writings, dispute is the product of purposive interaction between two or several parties in a competitive situation. Under such circumstances, a party's achievement of the intended goals becomes improbable to the same extent that the other one's goal accomplishment becomes probable.

In contrast to the other forms of power, political power is more "exclusive" and less dividable and propagable. Even in a factional and competitive democratic political system, there is exclusive domination over the resources of the political power and government at least periodically (Ghavam, 2008, pp.127-135).

In elaborating the individual and collective dispute-instigating actions, David Apter and Charles Andrine stated that they are products of an array of cultural and structural factors and psychological motivations and individuals' interpretations. According to them, the cultural gaps and biased beliefs increasingly guide the dispute towards confrontation and conflict and keep them away from the peaceful solutions for resolving the political disputes. This way, individuals and groups get involved in the political disputes based on three indicators, namely culture, psychological structures and motivations (Karimi Maleh, 2001, p.54). The situation in dispute differs from the situation in tension; under the tense conditions, only one party may feel being in a confrontational and engagement situation and these conditions may be even not completely vividly displayed rather they might be hidden in the form of fear, dread, suspicion and enmity without these situations being necessarily visible in the other party. In other words, in tense situations, the engaged parties are unaware of the conflict and/or confrontation of the interests or their own position in respect to the other and they may even take no conscious measures for deterring or invading the other. However, tension can be considered as a prelude to the formation of dispute (Dotherti and Faltzgraff, 1997, p.297).

From the perspective of Ubershal, the theory and concept of struggle is not only reduced and limited to violent confrontations over the resources and values rather it has to encompass situations in which the incongruent forces with inconsistent interests and values engage in confrontation with one another in a nonviolent manner and without it being necessarily followed by the elimination or damaging of an engagement party. In the end, the dispute's conditions

¹² Richard Kathm (1991) Nationalism in Iran, translation, fereshte Serlak, Tehran (Cyrus Ghani 1999), Iran The rise of Reza Khan, the fall of the Qajar and the role of the British, translated by Hassan Kamshad, Tehran.

and situations should feature continuity and persistence in temporal terms in such a way that the parties are found engaged in a process of mutual struggles and preparatory actions. The power mechanisms differ in the two general approaches to the political interactions, i.e. cooperation and dispute by the power centers in line with the intended goals. In fact, as Altuser put it, these instruments can be divided into two police-military and civil sets. In general, the following mechanisms are utilized by the power centers in their political relations with one another.

7.1 Suppressive power

Upon hearing the term power, most of the individuals think of physical force. In this type of power, the main motivation for obedience is fear of punishment. Application of this type of power in clear-cut cases is in the form of physical punishment and the object of power exertion loses its ability of expressing ideas and gives up to the power in softer cases because it would otherwise face more severe penalty and scorn and harsher suppression to become silent (Galberiath, 1991, p.30).

7.1.1 Instrumental coercion

Instrumental coercion means the imposition of the government's will to the oppositions through the application of material and vivid instruments. From the perspective of Makaveli, this type of power is the primary aspect of power. In his mind, the group of the political rulers who doubt to use violence would never succeed in acquiring power in the first place and/or they may lose the power if they had it beforehand (Azdanlou, 1995, p.17).

7.1.2 Structural coercion

Structural coercion is the one inserted in the structure of the rules and regulations and the government is no longer forced to resort to the mechanism of police force for achieving its goal(s) and it is in this way that the application of coercion is somewhat reduced (Bashiriyeh, 2001, p.86).

7.2 Civil power

7.2.2 Encouraging power

Obedience is not always the result of fear of punishment, especially in the communities wherein business and commercial relations exist. Overuse of power seems to be a sort of utilitarianism in which case the power-holder has access to material resources by the means of which, it can guarantee the coordination and adjustment in the others' behaviors and win their obedience in exchange for the material rewards.

7.2.3 Ideological coercion

Ideologies are indeed frameworks of insight giving individuals an interpretation of the world for inciting actions based on them (Robert Gerr, 2015, p.244). In ideological coercion, individuals are not aware that they have been subjected to compulsion because they have been somehow induced with the logics of the compulsive factor and they think it is natural and rational to the extent that some writers do not know ideological acceptance as essentially a topic in coercion and recount it as a part of the political socialization process (Bashiriyeh, 2001, p.87).

7.2.4 Instrument of advertisement

Advertisement methods include all of the mechanisms by which the government publishes its intended information with the objective of inciting the target groups for taking certain social actions in a given form and manner. The thing that distinguishes the two functions of the government's advertisement and informing measures is the news-issuing source's expectation of certain actions from the news receivers. In information-provisioning, no social action or its change is demanded but, in advertisement, the programmers want it beforehand through providing the intended information to bring about certain changes in the individual and social actions of the target groups.

8. Study Findings

In this study, the emphasis is on showing the policies of encouraging the relations between Bakhtiari and Reza Shah from the coup of 1299 until the reign of Reza Shah in 1304 AD to the close of 1307 AD. Therefore, other mechanisms are not discussed in the relations between Bakhtiari tribe and Reza Shah. For various reasons, the main policy in the relationship between Bakhtiari's government and Reza Khan's rule from the coup of 1299 AD to his reign in 1304 AD and further up to 1307 AD was based more on policy of encouragement, compromise, cooperation and support

9. Political Privileges

The Bakhtiari tribal leaders, especially the traditional leaders who dominated their tribal unions and their territories, had become one of the influential centers of macroeconomic policy upon entering Tehran during the constitutional revolution. Their leaders had not only become rich and powerful leaders of the tribes but also had great political power to the point where even most of them were elected governors and governors of most provinces. In addition, the economic and political relations of Bakhtiari leaders - mostly traditional and older leaders - with the United Kingdom and the establishment of cooperative interactions between them had led Bakhtiari to enjoy the support of a strong foreign government (Cronin, 2014: 362-361). Ja'afar Gholi Khan Sardar As'ad Bakhtiari who was a leader of Bakhtiari tribes in the second cabinet also attended the other numerous cabinets as the army commander during the Reza Shah's government. The governorship of Khuzestan (former Arabia) had been assigned for a while to Sardar As'ad (Abrahamian, 2013, p.172 and Krobine, 2014, p.376). Sardar As'ad was trying to establish good relationships between the heads of tribes and government of Reza Shah. He set the ground for a meeting between the tribes' heads, including Ghashghai Ilkhanate and heads of Boyer Ahmad Tribe, and Reza Shah in Tehran (Jahanbazi, 2015, pp.102-104). Muhammad Taghi As'ad Bakhtiari, known as War Commander, was appointed in the fifth legislative period in 1923 as a representative of the city of Saveh in the national consultative assembly; during November, 1925, he was chosen from the city of Saveh as a member of the first constituent assembly and voted for Reza Khan's sultanate. Next, he attended the congress as one of the political keys of Bakhtiari Tribe in the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth tenures as the representative of Dezfoul's people (Nazari, 2009, p.86). Reza Shah's government also

demanded the perspectives and advisory notions from the heads of Bakhtiari tribe for such important issues as elections ^[13]. In this regard, Kronine had the following words: “the great Khans held instruments for exerting maximum domination by the government over their own tribes and paved the way for a non-necessary direct military involvement. For instance, Bakhtiari Nomads were disarmed by their own Khans and the uprising by Bakhtiaris in 1929 was suppressed through the peace-seeking interventions by Tehran dwelling khans” (Ibid, p.363).

10. Preservation of Bakhtiari Tribes’ Ilkhans and Ilbeygs

In political terms, Ilkhan (tribe head) was a chieftain commanding a tribe. In general, Ilkhan had two duties, one before the central government and the other before his own dominated tribes. Ilkhan was in the apex of the tribe’s political pyramid and his representative and/or, indeed, his deputy was an Ilbeyg with the former being installed by the central government and the latter being appointed sometimes by the Ilkhan and occasionally by the confirmation of the central government. Except deputyship position and the formal governorship of Chahar Mahal to which individuals were installed by the central government, the rest of the ranks were indeed representatives of the Ilkhan and were assigned to responsibilities like collecting tax, establishing order and protecting the tribes’ internal security and so on. At the time of Afshariyan and Zandiyeh governments, the titles like Beyg, chieftain, functionary, financial officer and Khan were given to Bakhtiaris. Until before Hussein Gholi Khan, individuals from Bakhtiari Tribes were politically in the apex of the Bakhtiari’s political structure as khans and the Ilkhan title had not been given to any of the Bakhtiari rulers. Ilkhan title has been given to Hussein Gholi Khan since Naser Al-Din Shah Qajar’s era (Ghorban Pourdashtaki, 2011, pp.70-71). At the same time with the coup in 1920, Amir Mofakham was the Ilkhan and Mortaza Gholi Khan was the Ilbeyg. At this time, Reza Shah’s government did not intend any military confrontations and suppressions of Bakhtiari Tribe. Due to the same reason, when discrepancies arouse between Bakhtiaris over the Ilkhan and Ilbeyg positions, he applied encouraging lenient and non-violent highly engineered policies instead of using this opportunity in favor of the central government and for overthrowing the Ilkhan and Ilbeyg positions amongst the Bakhtiaris, he assigned Sardar Mozaffar, the younger brother of Sardar As’ad, to Ilbeyg position of the Bakhtiari Tribe and assigned Sardar Mofakham, the elder and head of Haji Family, to the Ilkhan position thereof (Sina’ei, 2005, pp.294-308 and Ghorbanpour Dashtaki, 2011, p.302). The adoption of such a policy by the first Pahlavi government caused the Bakhtiari heads, especially the older ones, to be mostly inclined towards the application of non-violent dispute policies and/or, in other words, policies based on encouragement and lenience in their political relations with Reza Shah’s government until 1930 and even after that till the apprehension and execution of Sardar As’ad in 1933.

11. Bakhtiari’s cooperation with reza shah’s government in suppressing the various tribe-driven and other non-tribe uprisings

¹³ For more information, see Shafi’ei, pp.36-44.

In the onset of his entry into Iran’s political scene, Reza Shah did not start military confrontation with Bakhtiari Tribe rather he made efforts to take advantage of their military power that they had acquired by possession of oil shares, large amount of military arms, solid tribal structure, appropriate population, strategic geographical position as well as the cooperation between the Bakhtiari heads so as to be able to use military might of Bakhtiari Tribe against the other clans and their uprisings. In this regard, Abrahamian had the following words: “Reza Shah postponed suppression of Bakhtiaris substantially for the reason of being in need of them for fighting Ghashghais, Arabs, Baluchs and Boyer Ahmadis” (Abrahamian, 2013, p.172). Reza Khan took advantage of Bakhtiari Tribe’s power in suppressing several local and tribal uprisings, the most important of which are suppression of Taghi Khan Pasiyan’s uprising in K ^[14]. horasan, suppression of Turkmans’ uprising in Turkman Sahra, suppression of Sheikh Khaz’al’s uprising in Khuzestan (that was called Arabia at that time) and finally suppression of the uprising by Boyer Ahmad Tribe.

12. Financial Aids Exchanged between Bakhtiari Tribe and Reza Shah’s Government

Bakhtiaris did not solely suffice to military and administrative support of Reza Shah and cooperation for overthrowing Qajar Dynasty ^[15]. rather they also presented Reza Shah with precious financial aids and invaluable gifts. As an example, Bakhtiaris paid a total sum of twenty thousand tomans during Reza Shah’s enthronement (Afshar, 1999, p.277) and, in 1927, a portray was painted of Reza Shah for a price of three thousand tomans in Paris by the order of Sardar Mohtasham Bakhtiari as one of Bakhtiari heads and it was presented on behalf of Bakhtiaris to Reza Khan. Furthermore, Bakhtiaris’ war commander presented Reza Shah with a tapestry for a price of two thousand tomans and Mortaza Gholi Khan gifted him with a shotgun and a pakard car for a price of a thousand liras (Afshar, 1999, p.204).

13. Uprising by Peasants

Encouraged by the officials in Reza Shah’s government, peasants’ riots against Khans were spread in the villages. The peasants claimed that land and water belong to the God and crops of the farms belong to the person working on them. They meant that they actually belong to the peasants. They avoided paying any money sums or any share of the crops to the khans. A committee of the peasants was formed. The foresaid committee set a plan and shouldered the guidance of the peasants’ movement and started vividly threatening the Khans who were not only afraid of the peasants’ protests but also feared that the Bakhtiari Tribe, though not involved in the peasants’ riots, may rise up against the heads subject to the influence of the peasants’ uprising. The discrepancies of the young Bakhtiari heads and the hatred of the individuals in Bakhtiari Tribe for the great Bakhtiari heads had added to their fearfulness of the

¹⁴ 1923 AD, 1926 AD, 1925 AD.

¹⁵ In the course of interrogation after being arrested by Reza Shah’s governmental system and in response to a question about his support of Muhammad Hussein Mirza Qajar for restoring Qajar Dynasty, Sardar As’ad replies that “I would like to state that my family all knew that I was hateful of the whole Qajar Dynasty and a lover and worshipper of his highness the king”.

various Bakhtiari classes. The outcome of such a situation was that the great Bakhtiari elders became satisfied with the fulfillment of the least of their demands of Reza Shah's government and somehow sought cooperating with the central government. On the other hand, as it was mentioned above, although Reza Shah's government took measures in line with supporting and expanding the peasants' uprising in Bakhtiari village in the beginning so as to take advantage of them against Bakhtiari tribes, this commission started investigating the farmers' complaints and Khans' claims for owning the disputed lands. In the aforesaid commission's report that was published in July, the final judgment had been issued in favor of the Khans nearly in all the villages. The villagers rejected the commission's decisions and, on the contrary, Reza Shah's government installed an army officer instead of the non-military governor of Chahar Mahal to the governorship and he had been authorized to make use of the police force majeure if necessary so as to coerce the peasants to the acceptance of the commission's decision and payment of the Khans' demands. The new military governor took steps in line with operationalizing his assigned duties as a result of which the Khans began receiving the customary cash and material demands as the owners (Kronine, 2014, pp.389-390). The uprising by the Bakhtiari peasants against Bakhtiari heads led to increasingly more cooperation between the great Bakhtiari chieftains and the central government and vice versa. The disintegration of Bakhtiaris' tribal structure, the gap between the leaders and the Bakhtiari people masses and more reliance of the Bakhtiari heads on the central government played considerable roles in the weakening of the Bakhtiari Tribe's military power. Such a happening was per se part of the policy based on encouragement and cooperation devised for the relations between Reza Shah's government and Bakhtiari Tribe's heads.

14. Conclusion

This study shows that the political relations of Reza Shah's government with the tribe of Bakhtiari were not completely in conflict. Reza Shah's and Il Bakhtiari's rule helped each other almost as far as possible during the reign of Reza Shah. Reza Shah's government initially tried to use the Bakhtiari government and its leaders in various cases in favor of Reza Shah's policies by avoiding military confrontation with the Bakhtiari tribe. However, at the same time it tried to use different mechanisms simultaneously to weaken the power of Bakhtiari tribe and ultimately to destroy the semi-independent Bakhtiari tribe government. The Bakhtiari tribe, on the other hand, sought to maintain a semi-independent government that received the favorable opinion of the central government of Reza Shah Nesit to the Bakhtiari tribe and its leaders. The leaders of Pir Il Bakhtiari, in particular Commander (Sardar) Asad III, have made various efforts to support the regime of Reza Shah. However, for various reasons, with the emergence of internal disagreements between Bakhtiari leaders and the Bakhtiari internal society and other reasons, the relationship between the Bakhtiari tribe and Reza Shah's government eventually turned into military conflict. As a result of this military conflict, the regime of Reza Shah succeeded in suppressing and destroying the Bakhtiari government in order to create a single state and a single nation based on his political ideology. Under such circumstances, the parties collaborated with one another in different and numerous

arenas and cases. Amongst the cases that can be called as the examples of the application of the encouraging policy in the political relations between Bakhtiari Tribe and Reza Shah until 1930, the followings could be pointed out:

1. Political privileges
2. Maintaining Bakhtiari tribe's Ilkhan and Ilbeyg positions
3. Cooperation between Bakhtiaris and Reza Shah's government in suppressing the various tribal and non-tribal uprisings
4. Financial aids exchanged between Bakhtiari Tribe and Reza Shah's government
5. Riots by peasants

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